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MOSCOW SECURITY CONFERENCE

- I. We in the intelligence community have recognized that in the short term, the Orbit security conference concluded on 2 December was obviously a propaganda gesture, intended to warn that ratification of the Paris agreements would be met with Orbit countermeasures.
- II. As for its immediate military importance, even the implimentation of the threat to form a combined East European military command will have little effect on the direct control maintained by the USSR over all Satellite military activities.
- III. But we must not lose sight of the fact that the recent conference laid the ground work for a long-range course of action, and as such is taken seriously by the USSR.
- IV. On a long-range basis, the threatened combined command, perhaps under a new multilateral mutual assistance pact, would have advantgges over Moscow's present system of bilateral military control in East Europe.
 - A. Further "justification" could be given to enlargement of East German armed forces, introduction of conscription, and public announcement of an East German defense ministry.
 - B. Legal basis could be created for indefinite presence of Soviet troops in Satellites, or their entrance into

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Bulgaria and Czechoslovakia.

- C. Under sub-regional or "Front" commands, Soviet Command over Satellite formations could be exercised overtly and acceptably.**
- D. If carefully handled by USSR, limited Satellite participation in work of combined command could be a long-term morale factor.**
- E. Semblance of greater respect for Satellites in a publicized combined command could have long-range "show-window" effect on non-Orbit Europeans particularly those in border states such as Finland and Yugoslavia.**

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